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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
JAMES C. MCELWEE, :
Plaintiff, :
-against- : 10 Civ. 00138 (KTD)
COUNTY OF ORANGE, : MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Defendants. :
KEVIN THOMAS DUFFY, U .S .D .J .:
This is a discrimination action arising under Title II of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the "ADA") and 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the 
"Rehabilitation Act"). Defendant County of Orange ("Defendant") 
brings this Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 motion for 
summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff James McElwee 
("Plaintiff") does not have a legally cognizable disability 
within the meaning of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, 
Plaintiff is not an "otherwise qualified" individual, and that 
the termination of Plaintiff was not because of his disability 
but rather for his inappropriate behavior.
For the following reasons, Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment is GRANTED.
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I. Factual Background
Plaintiff began participating in a volunteer program at 
Valley View Center for Nursing Care and Rehabilitation ("Valley 
View"), a federally funded public entity, in 1996.1 Plaintiff's 
Complaint contends that he is a "disabled individual who has 
Asperger's Syndrome, a developmental disorder on the autism 
spectrum characterized by problems in socialization and 
communication skills. This disorder substantially limits 
plaintiff's ability to communicate and associate with his peers 
and colleagues." (Compl. f 6). Plaintiff's volunteer duties at 
Valley View included janitorial and housekeeping duties. 
Plaintiff contends that "[f]or the duration of [his] 
relationship with Valley View, he was regarded as a good and 
conscientious volunteer who greatly contributed to the 
facility." (Compl. f 13).
On November 20, 2009, Martha Thompson ("Thompson"), a staff 
member at Valley View, informed Robin A. Darwin ("Darwin"), 
Valley View's Assistant Administrator, that Plaintiff was 
"acting inappropriately towards her and making her 
uncomfortable. "
xFor the purposes of this discussion, all facts detailed in this factual 
background are deemed admitted by both parties. See Defendant's Rule 56.1 
Statement, Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Rule 56.1 Statement, & Plaintiff 
James McElwee's Affidavit.
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Affidavit of Robin Darwin ("Darwin Aff.") at f 5. Thompson 
and Darwin had a lengthy conversation regarding various 
incidents regarding Plaintiff, including:
1) Thompson telling Darwin that Plaintiff had waited for her 
in the "town center," a central area of the Valley View 
facility, and then walked behind her and followed her in 
the halls. Thompson told Darwin she had caught Plaintiff 
looking at her rear end while following her. Id. at 1 6.
2) Thompson telling Darwin that on September 25, 2009, there 
was an incident where she walked past Plaintiff in the 
hallway outside the cafeteria at Valley View. Thompson 
told Darwin that Plaintiff stopped and turned around to 
look at her as she passed. Thompson told Darwin that 
when she asked Plaintiff what was going on, he said that 
he thought someone was calling him. Id. at t 7.
3) Thompson telling Darwin that on multiple occasions 
Plaintiff would follow her, and when Thompson stopped so 
that Plaintiff could pass, Thompson would stop and wait 
for her to walk again. Id. at f 8.
4) Thompson telling Darwin that she was aware of at least 
two other women employed at Valley View that Plaintiff 
had made feel uncomfortable or had "bothered." Id. at f
11 .
3
Case 1:10-cv-00138-KTD Document 30 Filed 09/30/11 Page 4 of 18
Darwin followed up this discussion by contacting and 
speaking with Yvonne, one of the women that Thompson had 
identified that Plaintiff had made feel uncomfortable. Yvonne 
stated that Plaintiff engaged in the same type of behavior 
toward her that Thompson had previously described to Darwin, but 
that she was not really bothered by it. Id. at  ^ 12.
November 24, 2009 Meeting With Plaintiff
On November 24, 2009, Darwin and Amy Fey ("Fey"), Director 
of Activities at Valley View, met with Plaintiff to inform him 
that a complaint had been made about him and to discuss the 
allegations with him. Id. at H 13. Darwin informed Plaintiff 
that she had received a complaint from a female employee that he 
was making feel uncomfortable and asked him if he knew who that 
might be. Plaintiff responded that he thought it was a social 
worker by the name of Lindsay. Id. at H 16. Darwin then asked 
Plaintiff why he thought Lindsay would say that about him, to 
which he replied that he "look[s] at her and talk[s] to her."
Id. When Darwin stated that it was not Lindsay who complained, 
Plaintiff responded that it might be a particular nurse's aid, 
whose name he could not identify. He stated "I talk to her too, 
and look at her." Id. at f 17. Plaintiff then stated that God 
was trying to punish him because of his "history," and when 
Darwin asked him to explain this, he said that when he was in 
high school he "made a mean phone call to a girl, saying
4
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nasty/dirty things" but that nothing ultimately happened because 
the cops told him that he was nice. Id. at f 18.
Fey then took Plaintiff out of the room. During this time, 
Plaintiff told Fey that "there needs to be punishment and now," 
while making a motion with his hand across his throat, as if he 
was slitting his throat. Id. at 19. When Darwin called 
Plaintiff back into the office and asked him what he meant by 
that gesture, he stated that he "deserve[d] to be punished when 
[he does] bad things." Id. at U 20. Plaintiff then began 
making faces that seemed like he was getting angry and stated 
"just when I think someone is going to pat me on the back 
someone stabs me," simultaneously putting his hand into a fist 
as if he were holding a knife and repeatedly making stabbing 
motions. Id. at 5 21. When Darwin informed Plaintiff that it 
was Thompson who made the complaint about him, Plaintiff stated 
"Oh, I should have known. I had a feeling she was going to turn 
me in." Id. at H 23. Darwin then told Plaintiff to avoid any 
other contact with Thompson. Id. at f 24.
Later this day, Darwin spoke with the Valley View Facility 
Administrator, Bill Pasocello, who told Darwin that she should 
conduct a further investigation regarding Plaintiff if she was 
considering terminating his volunteer services. Id. at f 25. 
November 25, 2009 Meeting With Plaintiff
5
Case 1:10-cv-00138-KTD Document 30 Filed 09/30/11 Page 6 of 18
On November 25, 2009, Darwin met with Plaintiff and 
informed him that she was disturbed by the situation, that she 
needed to investigate it more, and that he should leave and not 
return to the premises until he heard from her. Id. at f 28.
At this time, Plaintiff started to cry, said that Darwin was a 
conduit of God, that God was punishing him for what he had done 
in the past, and that God was telling him that he should not do 
these things anymore. Id. at K 29. Plaintiff also made 
statements saying that he had been conducting research at the 
library over the last several months regarding domestic violence 
and sexual harassment to see if his own conduct qualified as 
either one. Id.
November 25, 2009 Investigative Meetings
On November 25, 2009, Darwin met with Liz Murphy 
("Murphy"), one of the women that Thompson previously identified 
as being a woman who was made uncomfortable by Plaintiff's 
conduct. Id. at 30-31. Murphy recounted to Darwin the 
following details regarding Plaintiff:
1) Murphy stated that Plaintiff had a history of watching 
her and following her while she went for a walk on her 
breaks, a behavior pattern which had escalated since the 
prior spring, with Plaintiff increasingly becoming more 
visible over time. Id.
6
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2) Murphy further recalled an incident in which she was 
distributing paychecks at the switchboard desk in the 
lobby and Plaintiff sat in the lobby and watched her the 
entire time. She stated that she then moved her chair so 
that she was out of his sight. Id.
3) Murphy stated that she went out of her way to avoid 
Plaintiff and give him the "cold shoulder." She further 
stated that she told the Valley View security guard, Eric 
Gould ("Gould"), about Plaintiff's behavior towards her 
and that Gould had informed her that he had other 
complaints from other women about Plaintiff. Id. at f
32 .
Darwin then met with Gould regarding Plaintiff's conduct.
Id. at 33-34. During this meeting, Gould stated the 
following information regarding Plaintiff:
1) Gould stated that both Thompson and Murphy told him that 
Plaintiff's behavior made them uncomfortable. Id.
2) Gould stated that Thompson told him of an instance where 
Plaintiff was acting "unprofessionally and 
inappropriately" toward a woman wearing a revealing 
blouse. Id.
7
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3) Gould stated that he had personally observed Plaintiff 
acting inappropriately around female nursing students and 
visitors. Id. at fH 37-38.
Darwin then met with Barbara Decker ("Decker"), a payroll 
department employee at Valley View. Id. at 39-40. Decker 
stated that Plaintiff had a stuffed dolphin that he asked women 
to pet and stated that there was a sexual innuendo in the way he 
acted with the stuffed dolphin. Id. at f 41. Decker also 
stated that Plaintiff inquired about dating her daughter. Id. 
at 1) 42. Decker stated that Plaintiff used to "watch [her] with 
peering eyes" and that she went out of her way to avoid him.
Next, Darwin met with Irene Simpson ("Simpson"), Activities 
Supervisor at Valley View. Simpson stated that Plaintiff had 
been asked in the past not to come in due to "overanxious" 
behavior, which included pacing and talking to himself. Id. at 
<] 45. Simpson stated that Plaintiff once said to her, "Do you 
realize what I could do to you?," in what she felt was a 
physically threatening way. Id. at f 46. She stated that she 
was concerned due to the fact that he was physically large and 
might have had the potential to be violent. Id.
Darwin then spoke with Pat Matero ("Matero"), the Director 
of Admissions at Valley View. Matero stated that once Plaintiff 
came up to her and asked her how he would look in a Speedo. Id.
8
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at HI 49-50. She further stated that she had observed Plaintiff 
"playing up" to the young aides with sexual innuendo. Id.
Finally, Darwin had a telephone conversation with Maureen 
Torelli ("Torelli"), the former Deputy Commissioner at Valley 
View. Id. at f 51. Torelli stated that there was an issue that 
arose with Plaintiff's inappropriate behavior regarding 
Plaintiff carrying around a dolphin puppet and asking residents 
to pet it. Id. at f 52.
Plaintiff's Termination
Defendant contends that based on Darwin's investigation, 
Darwin concluded that Plaintiff was a potential liability for 
sexual harassment of the staff, students, and visitors. In 
addition, Darwin claims that she observed disturbing and 
frightening behavior when Plaintiff was confronted with the 
allegations. Darwin consulted with Valley View's Facility 
Administrator, the County Executive's Office, and the County Law 
Department regarding the results of the investigation and wrote 
Plaintiff a letter on December 1, 2009, stating that his 
volunteer services were no longer needed.2
II. Legal Standard
2“On December 10, 2009, Plaintiff and other special-needs individuals arrived 
at Valley View to sing Christmas carols for the residents. However, once 
Plaintiff arrived at the facility, Plaintiff was told by Valley View's 
security guard that he was not allowed inside the building "because of ’what 
had happened recently.'" (Compl, % 19).
9
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A party is entitled to summary judgment "if the movant 
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 247 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of showing 
that no issue of material fact exists. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has made this 
showing, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show 
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . 
. . . The nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Caldarola v. 
Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotations 
and citation omitted). "[C]onclusory allegations" and 
"unsubstantiated speculation," will not defeat a motion for 
summary judgment. Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 
1998). "There is no issue for trial unless there exists 
sufficient evidence in the record favoring the party opposing 
summary judgment to support a jury verdict in that party's 
favor." Gonzalez v. Rite Aid of N.Y., Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 
122, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). In analyzing a summary judgment
motion, the court must view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom summary judgment is sought 
and must draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.
10
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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
III. Discussion
In order to prevail under the disability acts, a plaintiff 
must show that "(1) that she is a qualified individual with a 
disability; (2) that the defendants are subject to one of the 
Acts; and (3) that she was denied the opportunity to participate 
in or benefit from defendants' services, programs, or 
activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by 
defendants, by reason of her disability." Harris v. Mills, 572 
F. 3d 66, 73-74 (2d Cir. 2009).
Defendant argues Plaintiff has not established a prima 
facie case, contending that Valley View was not aware of 
Plaintiff's alleged disability, that Plaintiff was not 
substantially impaired in a major life activity and thus does 
not qualify as "disabled" under the disability acts, that 
Plaintiff was not "otherwise qualified" by virtue of his 
inappropriate behavior, and that the termination of Plaintiff's 
volunteer position was not because of his alleged disability, 
but rather because of inappropriate behavior. Without 
addressing all of Defendant's contentions, I will solely focus 
on whether Plaintiff was "substantially impaired in a major life 
activity" and deemed "disabled" under the disability acts. For
Case 1:10-cv-00138-KTD Document 30 Filed 09/30/11 Page 12 of 18
the reasons set forth below, I find that Defendant is entitled 
to summary judgment as a matter of law because I find that no 
rational trier of fact could find that Plaintiff was 
substantially impaired in the major life activity of interacting 
with others and thus does not have a legally cognizable 
disability under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act.
The Second Circuit "follows 'a three-step process for 
determining whether a plaintiff has a disability' that is protected 
by the ADA." Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 201 (2d Cir. 
N.Y. 2004). Accordingly, "[w]e consider: (1) "whether the plaintiff
suffered from a physical or mental impairment," (2) whether "'the 
life activity' upon which the plaintiff relied . . . constitutes a
major life activity under the ADA," and (3) whether "the plaintiff's 
impairment 'substantially limited' [the] major life activity 
identified." Id. Plaintiff contends, and submits medical records, 
that he has been diagnosed with "Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not 
Otherwise Specified," and argues that his major life activity of 
"social interaction skills" is substantially limited by virtue of his 
inability to "communicate and associate with peers and colleagues." 
(Compl. *[*[6-7) . For purposes of this discussion, I find that this 
diagnosed disorder constitutes a mental impairment. Jacques, 386 
F.3d at 201, However, for the reasons outlined below, I do not find 
that Plaintiff's impairment has "substantially limited" the "major 
life activity" of being able to interact with others.
12
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In this Circuit, "interacting with others" constitutes a "major 
life activity" under the ADA. Id. at 203. However, there is a 
critical distinction between "getting along with others" and 
"interacting with others:"
We return to the distinction between "getting along 
with others" (a normative or evaluative concept) and 
"interacting with others" (which is essentially 
mechanical). We hold that a plaintiff is 
"substantially limited" in "interacting with others" 
when the mental or physical impairment severely limits 
the fundamental ability to communicate with others.
This standard is satisfied when the impairment 
severely limits the plaintiff's ability to connect 
with others, i.e., to initiate contact with other 
people and respond to them, or to go among other 
people -- at the most basic level of these activities.
The standard is not satisfied by a plaintiff whose 
basic ability to communicate with others is not 
substantially limited but whose communication is 
inappropriate, ineffective, or unsuccessful. A 
plaintiff who otherwise can perform the functions of a 
job with (or without) reasonable accommodation could 
satisfy this standard by demonstrating isolation 
resulting from any of a number of severe conditions, 
including acute or profound cases of: autism, 
agoraphobia, depression or other conditions that we 
need not try to anticipate today.
Id. at 203-04. Plaintiff contends that his diagnosed disorder, 
his documented medical history, and his conduct at Valley View 
sufficiently evidence that he is "substantially limited" in his 
ability to interact with others. Defendant contends that, while 
Plaintiff may suffer from a diagnosed disorder, Plaintiff does 
not lack the basic fundamental ability to communicate with 
others that is required under the Jacques standard, but rather
13
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his communication is merely "inappropriate, ineffective, or 
unsuccessful."
Until the date of his termination in 2009, Plaintiff had 
been a volunteer at Valley View since 1996. During this time, 
Plaintiff describes his volunteer duties as "helping staff and 
residents with housekeeping responsibilities, i.e., janitorial 
assignments and transporting residents within the building to 
and from religious and social activities." Plaintiff contends 
that he was regarded as a good volunteer throughout his tenure 
as a volunteer at Valley View.
Plaintiff first contends that he qualifies under the 
Jacques standard by virtue of his diagnosis and mannerisms 
outlined in various psychological reports and affidavits 
submitted as exhibits to his Opposition. However, "the fact 
that plaintiff's treating physicians have confirmed that [he] 
indeed exhibits such behavior does not mean that [he] is 
disabled within the meaning of the statute." Montgomery v. 
Chertoff, No. 03 CV 5387 (ENV) (JMA), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
30519, at *24 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2007) (holding that the
plaintiff was not substantially impaired in her interactions 
with others despite the fact that "[p]hysicians who have treated 
plaintiff's ADHD have confirmed that plaintiff experiences 
difficulty interacting with others.").
14
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Next, Plaintiff asserts that his ability to interact with 
others is a fact issue for the jury. However, I find that in 
the instant case, while Plaintiff may suffer from a diagnosed 
disorder, no reasonable jury could find that his demonstrated 
conduct evidences the fundamental limitations on the ability to 
communicate with others on the basic level that the Jacques 
court contemplated to qualify as disabled under the ADA and the 
Rehabilitation Act.3 Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his 
mental impairment substantially impairs his ability "to connect 
with others, i.e., to initiate contact with other people and 
respond to them, or to go among other people --at the most 
basic level of these activities." Jacques, 386 F,3d at 201. 
Rather, the events giving rise to this Action clearly show that 
Plaintiff's communications with others are within the 
"inappropriate, ineffective or unsuccessful" category that 
Jacques explicitly stated is not afforded protection. While it
■’Moreover, Plaintiff's own affidavit submitted in support of his 
Opposition reveals an articulate individual who is able to 
clearly express his thoughts and ideas. See id. (finding that 
the plaintiff's "deposition [was] particularly revealing in that 
plaintiff!] presents as an articulate and perceptive witness."); 
LaBella v. N.Y. City Admin, for Children's Servs., No. 02-CV- 
2355 (NGG) (KAM), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18296, at *34 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 11, 2005) (finding that "[the plaintiff's] deposition 
testimony reveals that he is relatively articulate" in 
interacting with others).
15
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is clearly evident that Plaintiff's mental impairment has 
contributed to his inability to get along or effectively 
communicate with certain staff members, visitors, and residents, 
"mere trouble getting along with coworkers is not sufficient to 
show a substantial limitation." Montgomery, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 30519, at *24-25 (internal citation omitted).
Indeed, Plaintiff's listed duties as a volunteer, as well 
as the undisputed facts in the record giving rise to this Action 
show that Plaintiff is able to initiate contact and respond to 
people at the most basic level. Plaintiff's own affidavit 
details several instances of him corresponding with colleagues, 
recounting instances of Plaintiff joking and participating in 
conversations with several different individuals. The fact that 
Plaintiff's interactions turn out to be offensive, 
inappropriate, or unsuccessful, even as a manifestation of his 
diagnosed disorder, do not rise to the level of substantial 
limitation "at the most basic level." Montgomery, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 30519, at *25; LaBella v. N.Y. City Admin, for 
Children's Servs. , 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18296, at *34 
("Moreover, plaintiff's emotional and violent outbursts neither 
appear nor are claimed to be associated with any severe mental 
or physical impairment which affects plaintiff's ability to
16
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interact with others at the most basic level.").4 Plaintiff's 
behavioral abnormalities and asserted problems with being able 
to "communicate and associate with peers and colleagues," while 
significant, "go to the subjective quality of the communication, 
rather than the core question whether the plaintiff has the 
ability to communicate and thus interact with others." Bell,
398 F. Supp. 2d at 88.
4 Courts in other Circuits have followed this standard and 
accordingly found that a plaintiff's inability to exercise 
discretion or adequately subscribe to normative levels of 
appropriateness in social interactions do not rise to the level 
of being substantially impaired in the major life activity of 
interacting with others. See Badri v. Huron Hosp., 691 F. Supp. 
2d 744, 758 (N.D. Ohio 2010) ("While Plaintiff may not always 
have been able to exercise discretion in his conversation, and 
his discourse with others may not always have been entirely 
appropriate, there is no evidence that he was incapable of 
communicating with others."); Desmond v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 944, 
962 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (evidence that the plaintiff was 
"'depressed,' 'melancholy,' 'sulking,' [and] a 'sad sack,'" did 
not show plaintiff was substantially impaired in interacting 
with others but rather just inappropriate, ineffective, or 
unsuccessful); Bonieskie v. Mukasey, 540 F. Supp. 2d 190, 202 
(D.D.C. 2008) ("[A]n impairment does not constitute a
substantial limitation on one's ability to interact merely 
because it tends to reduce the subjective quality of one's 
interactions."); Logan v. Nicholson, No. H-04-4178, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 34359, at *22 (S.D. Tex. May 30, 2006) ("The court 
cannot subscribe to the view that Plaintiff's professed mood 
swings and stress-related symptoms experienced in contentious 
staff meetings are significant limitations to any major life 
activity."); Bell v. Gonzales, 398 F. Supp. 2d 78, 88 (D.D.C.
2005) ("[C]ommunications marked by hostility, argumentativeness,
or a cantankerous manner - including ill humor, irritability, or 
a determination to disagree - are not sufficient to demonstrate 
a substantial limitation of the activity of interacting with 
others.").
17
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IV. Conclusion
In summary, even assuming that Plaintiff has a mental 
impairment, I find that Plaintiff is not disabled under the 
relevant disability acts because he has not sufficiently shown 
that he is "substantially limited" in the major life activity of 
interacting with others. Thus, Plaintiff's prima facie case 
under these disability statutes is not met. Accordingly, 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and 
Plaintiff's case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: New York, N.Y.
September 2011
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